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Russia and the Assasination o f Franz Ferdinand
Matthew Kowalski
Ever since that June day in Sarajevo, there has been a cloud o f mystery surrounding the
events that led up the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Although there is
little doubt that the Bosnian assassin Gavrilo Princip and the rest o f the murder squad
were part o f a wider conspiracy centered in Serbia proper, the question o f Russian
compliance in the plot remains an unanswered question. In his letter to the Kaiser
following the murder o f his nephew, Emperor Franz Josef first raises the possibility of
Russian responsibility. His statement that the events o f June 28th was “ the direct
consequence of agitation carried out by Russian and Serbian Pan-Slavists” and that Serbia
is “ completely under Russian influence” firmly assert the claim o f Russian involvement.
Since then accusations have been made claiming that various Russian officials in both the
foreign ministry and the Imperial General Staff had received prior information o f the plot.
However, when one examines the nature o f St. Petersburg’s relationship with the radical
Pan-Serb organizations, it becomes apparent that the extent o f Russian compliance with
the plot was limited to a handful o f sympathetic officials in Belgrade.
The relationship between Russia and radical Pan-Serbian organizations, such as the
Black Hand, was a characterized by feelings o f mutual distrust. Although, the ideology of
Pan-Slavism appeared to unite the two, the reality was very different. Pan-Slavism had
existed since the mid-19"' century and was based on the concept o f the liberation o f all the
Slavic peoples from the rule o f either Austria or the Ottoman Empire. Russia had from the
start taken the leadership role in this movement and due to both political benefit and
feelings o f ethnic brotherhood adapted the ideology into its foreign policy. The extent to
which Pan-Slavism had become part o f Russia’s foreign policy by 1914 can be clearly seen
in the Russian Foreign Service’s Balkan specialist Prince G.N. Trubetosky’s statement
that, “ Russia’s true role in the world is to protect the smaller Slav states’ cultural and
political independence from Germanic pressure.”1Trubestosky’s statement was especially
relevant in regards to Russia’s relationship with Serbia.
The Serbian Pan-Slavic movement had from the time o f its inception been radical in its
nature and given a tendency toward violence. Hans Kohn notes that this radicalism was
characterized by “ a brutalization o f public life and the celebration as heroes o f terrorist
martyrs.”2 It was this affinity towards violence that strained relations between the Russian
government and organizations like the Black Hand. The government in St. Petersburg held
deep reservations about both the tactics and political leanings o f Black Hand, particularly
those o f its leader Colonel Dragutin Dimitrevic. Dimitrevic and most o f the other Black
Hand leaders had been involved in the 1911 assassination o f the King Alexander and
Queen Draga, which although resulting in increased Russian influence also raised the
question o f Dimitrevic’s possible republican sentiments. Many die-hard absolutists in the

1 Levin, D.C.B, Russia and the Origins ofthe First World War. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 1989, 93.
2 Kohn, Hans, Pan-Slavism- Its History and Ideology. Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press.
1953, 92.
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Russian court viewed the regicides as dangerous precedents in regards to their own
positions. Further more, the violent and ultra-radical brand o f Pan-Slavism preached by
Dimitrevic and his colleagues were in direct opposition to those o f the staunchly proRussian government o f Prime Minster Pasic and the 'Old Radicals'. On several occasions
the Tsar informed Serbia’s King Peter o f his fear o f the growing republican movement and
the need to eliminate the influence o f the regicide officers.3 The Russian ambassador to
Belgrade Nicholas Hartvig further echoed these sentiments by stating that, “ Russia’s
Balkan policy required Pasic in office.”4
For their part, the radical Pan-Serbs were as critical o f Russia as she was o f them. In
both the constitution o f the Black Hand and the radical Pan-Serb daily Piejemont, reliance
on Russia in the creation of a “greater Serbia” is never mentioned. Instead, the radical
Pan-Serb movement stressed concept o f the self-reliance o f Balkan peoples over the need
for any outside leadership. This point is clearly stated in Article 4 o f the Black Hand’s
constitution when Serbia, not Russia is referred to as the “ Piedmont o f Serbdom.” Also,
rather then praise Russia’s policy in the Balkans, Colonel Dimitrevic openly criticized her
secret diplomacy with Austria-Hungary dividing the Balkans into different spheres of
influence. An October 1911 issue o f Piejemont went as far to characterize Russia as a “
Brotherly Judas”, engaging in secret diplomatic arrangements at the expense o f Serbia and
the other Balkan Slavs.5
After looking at the differences that existed between the Russian government and the
radical Pan-Serb movement, it becomes very unlikely that the government in St.
Petersburg had any official role in the plot. Therefore, one must conclude that any Russian
compliance in the conspiracy must have come in the form o f individuals working on their
own initiative. Several Russian officials, largely due to their affinity toward Pan-Slavic
ideals, may have received prior knowledge o f the assassination attempt. However, when
assessing the available evidence, several o f these candidates were most likely completely
ignorant o f the conspiracy.
The first candidate that may have possessed knowledge o f the assassination was the
Foreign Minster, Serge Sazonov. Sazonov was a committed adherent o f the Pan-Slavic
ideology and was instrumental in forging the close relationship between Russia and Serbia.
He was also strongly anti-Austrian and a proponent o f Serb expansion in the Balkans. His
remarks to his Serbian counterparts in April 1913, “ that in the future they would
eventually get much territory from Austria”,6 makes clear his sympathy with the Pan-Serb
movement. However, Sazonov was a supporter of the more moderate brand o f Pan-Serb
nationalism professed by the Pasic and the Old Radicals and not that exposed by radicals
under Dimitrevic. Besides this, his action during the ‘July Crisis’ seem to indicate that
Sazonov was unaware o f the conspiracy. It can be argued that had he been fully aware of

3 Dedijer, Vladimir The Road to Sarajevo. New York: Simon and Schuster. 1966, 430.
4 MacKenzie, David Apis: The Congenial Conspirator. New York: Columbia University Press. 1989,
121.

5 Dedijer, Vladimir The Road to Sarajevo. New York: Simon and Schuster. 1966, 429.
Seton-Watson, R.W. Sarajevo. London: Hutchinson and Co. 1966, 59.
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the fa c t that the assassins were aided by elements within Serbia proper, he would have
shown greater willingness to compromise with Vienna.7 Instead, Sazonov assumed that
the Austrian charges o f Serbian involvement in the plot were nothing more then an
attempt to justify an invasion.
Another Russian official that may have received prior information concerning the
assassination plot was Sazonov’s top diplomat in Belgrade, Nicholas Hartvig. Like his
superior, Hartvig was a dedicated “ Slavophil” and saw a war between Serbia and AustriaHungary as being inevitable. His strong identification with the Pan-Serbian cause led one
Russian official to comment, “ that it would be better if in the first place he pursued only
Russia’s interest.”8 He was, however, a firm supporter o f the Pasic regime and was
concerned about the growing influence o f the radical Pan-Serb movement. Indeed, it was
largely Hartvig’s efforts that saved the Pasic government during the ‘May Crisis’ o f 1914
when Dimitrevic’s radical faction was preparing a coup. As expected, this intervention on
the side o f Pasic did not win Hartvig any friends amongst the radicals, who mockingly
referred to him as “ being the real ruler o f Serbia.”9 The very notion that Dimitrevic would
inform a man that he universally loathed o f the conspiracy seems highly unrealistic. Also,
Hartvig’s response on hearing the news o f the Archduke’s assassination, “ let us hope he
is not a Serb”10, speaks against his knowledge o f the conspiracy.
The one solid link between the conspiracy to assassinate the Archduke and Russia
comes in the form of St. Petersburg’s military attaches in Belgrade. Both Colonel Victor
Artamonov and his deputy Alexander Verkhovsky were committed Pan-Slavists and
through their official capacities had links to the leaders o f the Black Hand. The Russian
military’s officer corps, in contrast to their counterparts in the Foreign Service had always
been more sympathetic to the “direct action” tactics preached by the radical Pan-Serbs
then the moderate policy o f Pasic. In the army’s daily newspaper Novoye Vremya,
editorials echoing Pan-Slavic themes and anti- Austrian sentiments were common. Hartvig
took note o f the military’s feeling towards the radical Pan-Serb elements after a
conference with the Naval Minster Vladimir Lebedev. According to Hartivg, Lebedev
characterized the Black Hand “ as most popular, unselfish, idealistic and patriotic and
whose aims was solely unification and liberation o f the Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian
peoples.”11He went further in saying “ the most honorable o f the South Slav elements
grouped themselves around Colonel Dimitrevic,” a view that was in complete contrast to
that o f both that o f the Russian government and Foreign Ministry.
Besides the already strong Pan-Slav direction o f the Russian officer corps, the Black
Hand’s leaders had an established working relationship with the Russian military attaches

7 Lieven, D.C.B Russia and the Origins of the First World War. New York: St. Martins Press. 1989, 140.
8 Lieven, D.C.B Russia and the Origins of the First World War. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 1989,42.
9 Dedijer. Vladimir The Road to Sarajevo. New York: Simon and Schuster. 1966,431.
10 Jannen, William The Lions o f August —The Prelude to World War I. Novato, CA: Presidio Publishing.
1996,7.
11 Mackenzie, David Apis: The Congenial Conspirator. New York: Columbia University Press. 1989,
275.
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in the Serbian capital. In his duty as chief o f Serbian Military Intelligence, Colonel
Dimitrevic had official contacts with the Russian military attache Artamonov. It is known
that Artamonov was privy to intelligence gathered by Dimitrevic’s agents in AustriaHungary and from time to time provided a sum o f money for their expenses. Aratamonov
also had actively helped Dimitrevic infiltrate agents into both Bosnia and Macedonia and
unlike Hartvig, never expressed any strong sympathy for the Pasic regime. Finally, the two
men also trusted each other a great deal, so it is conceivable that Aratamonov would had
been told o f the plan to murder the Archduke.
After the war, some former members o f the Black Hand stated that before the
assassination Dimitrevic had made a point o f asking Aratamonov and his associate
Verkhovsky about Russia’s stance. The answer he was supposedly given was, “ Go on. If
they attack you, you are not going to be alone.”12However, it should be mentioned the
fact that this conversation ever took place must be called into question, largely because the
testimonies were made by second hand sources. Also, had he actually made such a
statement, Aratmonov was only expressing his personal view, and not quoting official
Russian policy. Finally, Aratamonov and Verkhovsky not only denied any knowledge of
the plot, but also had been given strict instructions by their superiors not to influence the
Serbian positions.13
The true nature o f Russia’s role in the plot to murder Franz Ferdinand will probably
never be known. There existed no hard evidence to support the claims that various
Russian officials had either a hand in or received any advanced knowledge o f the
assassination plot. What we can deduce from the available evidence seems to show that at
least a few sympathetic Russian officers in Belgrade may have had prior knowledge o f the
plot. At the same time, the distrust between the Russian government and the radical PanSerbs almost certainly discounts the allegations o f wide ranging Russian participation.

12 Dedijer, Vladimir The Road to Sarajevo. New York: Simon and Schuster. 1966,433.
13 Mackenzie, David, Apis-The Congenial Conspirator. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989,
130.
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